Partly due to the strong influence of Marxism and radical political economy perspectives, analyses of class identities in Nigeria have divided them into two broad classes. First is the dominant class or elite, which has also been variously referred to as the ruling class (elite), the political class (elite), the privileged class, and the hegemonic class (elite). Second is the dominated class, also called the masses, the ordinary people, and the non-elite; terms that describe the urban segment of the poor and underprivileged, as well as the peasantry which is the common name for rural dwellers. The working class, whose identity is built around labour, constitutes a special category of
the dominated classes. For a long time, analysts talked of a middle class, made up of the educated elite and the privileged salariat – intelligentsia, bureaucrats, technocrats, and so on. Today, the existence of this class is the subject of a debate because, as some argue, the middle class was wiped out by the regime of structural adjustment and authoritarianism that encouraged massive brain drain and pauperized members of the class.
Although class categories exist, it has been argued that in terms of consciousness of belonging to classes and acting on that basis, classes are fragile and underdeveloped in Nigeria. This explains why the term ‘elite’ is sometimes preferred to ‘class’. It is, however, generally agreed that the Nigerian elite is divided along ethnic, regional and religious lines, and that this is a major factor in the underdevelopment of class forces, including working class consciousness. The attachment to the exclusive symbols of ethnicity weakens class cultures as well as elite organization and occupational colleagueship. Notwithstanding such structural weaknesses, however, both the elite and the non-elite have proven capable of class-based mobilization and action, especially when their constitutive interests are threatened. This is true of labour, which has been able to mobilize workers to oppose unpopular government policies and to demand better conditions of service and political transformation including decolonization and democratization. However, it is no less true for the divided political elite that have closed ranks at critical points to ensure the survival and stability of the state. The circumstances that led the military to hand over power to civilians, and specifically to a Yoruba president in 1999, is a case in point.
Gender and youth identities have grown in importance over the last two decades, partly due to the strategic roles played by women and youths in the democratization struggles, and partly due to the expansion of political space. However, a large part of the emergent youth identities is well entrenched in ethnicity and communalism, having emerged from redress-seeking struggles by aggrieved ethnic groups. This is evident in the activities of new militant ethnic youth movements like the Odua Peoples’ Congress, the Arewa Peoples’ Congress, the Ijaw Youth Council, the Egbesu Boys of Africa, the Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force, the Bakassi Boys, the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra, the Hisba or Sharia Vigilante groups in the Muslim north, and the militias of the Tiv, Jukun and other ethnic groups in Nigeria’s many conflict zones. This ethnicization and militarization of Nigerian youth culture has been promoted significantly by: widespread socio-economic frustration and alienation (including relatively high levels of youth unemployment and underemployment); the legacy of state repression and impunity since 1984; and the sheer failure or inability of the national police and security agencies to fulfil their basic obligations to maintain law and order or protect lives and properties.
Gender identities have also sometimes been pursued through religious, ethnic, and regional structures, but they mostly belong to mainstream elitist and professional struggles for equality, representation, and participation. On the one hand, gender and sectional identities are often linked together in the construction of political claims in the Nigerian setting. Many Nigerian women have channelled their demands for recognition and participation through primordial organizations. Examples include the Federation of Muslim Women’s Associations, the Federation of Ogoni Women’s Associations, and the Southern Kaduna Women’s Organization. Indeed, ongoing attempts to promote and protect the rights of women living under Islamic penal codes have been most credible and successful when such efforts have been framed within, rather than outside, the framework of Islamic communal identity and the broad paradigm of Islamic jurisprudence. Yet, more often than not, ethnic, religious and regional divisions constrain the effective national mobilization of Nigerian women against entrenched patriarchal practices both in customary procedures for land use, marriage, divorce and inheritance and in the allocation of diverse resources in the modern public arena.
On the other hand, Nigerian women are divided not only by primordial identities, but also by class and professional fissures. Indeed, the representatives of the majority of ordinary, poor women have not spearheaded the most politically visible women’s associations in Nigeria. Rather, these associations are mainly led either by politically connected and often corrupt ‘femocrats’ (first ladies of political office holders) or by professionally privileged feminists. Because their authority derives solely from being married to powerful men who are implicated in the structures of gender inequality and other social inequities, the ‘femocrats’ are unable to fulfil their rhetorical commitments to the advancement of ordinary women. The feminists, on the other hand, are often preoccupied with the narrow interests of an upper class of professionals and businesswomen. Torn between the false populism of the ‘femocrats’ and the crass elitism of the feminists, the majority of Nigerian women have shunned political mobilization on a gender basis and maintained their preoccupation with individual and household economic survival.
