Ethnicity is generally regarded as the most basic and politically salient identity in Nigeria. This claim is supported by the fact that both in competitive and non-competitive settings, Nigerians are more likely to define themselves in terms of their ethnic affinities than any other identity. Indeed, according to the authoritative 2000 survey on “Attitudes to Democracy and Markets in Nigeria”, ethnicity “is demonstrably the most conspicuous group identity in Nigeria”. Thus, the survey found that almost one-half (48.2%) of Nigerians chose to label themselves with an ethnic (including linguistic and local-regional) identity, compared to almost one-third (28.4%) who opted for class identities, and 21.0 percent who chose a religious identity. In essence, close to two-thirds of the
population see themselves as members of primordial ethnic, regional, and religious groups. In other words, “Nigerians tend to cluster more readily around the cultural solidarities of kin than the class solidarities of the workplace”. What is more, “religious and ethnic identities are more fully formed, more holistic and more strongly felt than class identities” as evidenced in the fact that “whereas those who identify with religious and ethnic communities are almost universally proud of their group identities…those who see themselves as members of a social class are somewhat more equivocal about their pride”. All of this is not surprising, considering that ethnic formations are perhaps the most historically enduring behavioural units in the country, and were further reinforced by the colonial and post-colonial regimes.
Yet, in spite of the salience of ethnicity, and the large number of studies that have been devoted to the subject, the exact number of ethnic groups in the country is not known. A recent ethnic mapping project puts the number at over 500. The wide variation is largely explained by the different criteria used by the authors. Although language, kinship, core territoriality and myth of common origin are the main criteria, with in-group/out-group self definitions as correcting factor, there is no agreement on how to treat dialects of languages for example. Do these dialects constitute separate groups, or should they be regarded as sub-groupings or communal groups? Matters are not helped by the fact that ethnic identities and differentiations are intricately linked with other identities like religion, and furthermore they do not exist in pure forms.
There is also the fact that ethnic identities and boundaries, including myths of common origin, are fluid and subject to continuous construction and reconstruction. The case of the Ikwerre in the Rivers state is a good example of the problematic definition. They were Igbo before the civil war, but have since re-defined themselves to be a separate group. Migrant and dispersed groups that have somewhat become distant from the original group constitute another category of problematic classification: should they be regarded as part of the original group or as a different group?
In the final analysis, it is clear that ethnic diversity cannot be defined only in terms of categories employed by linguists and ethnographers. There is also the whole dimension of self-definition by members of the group and outsiders, which is a much more important determinant of so-called ethnic-based behaviour. As much as possible therefore, the objective diacritic, which many scholars emphasize, should be consistent with the ‘constructed reality’, self-ascribed identities, or ‘imagined communities’ of members of the group and outsiders to be valid. This is one useful way of assessing the validity of the various estimations.
Historically, ethnic identities in Nigeria have been summarized into the two broad categories of majority and minority groups. Although unequal size and population are essential to this differentiation, its origins lie more in the power configurations of the former colonial regions in which the large groups – Hausa/Fulani in the North, Igbo in the East and Yoruba in the West – held sway. This is all the more important because prior to the creation of these regions, there were no major or minor group distinctions in the country. However, with the regions came a ‘core’ comprising the major group and a ‘periphery’ made up of numerous ‘small groups’ or minorities. The creation and multiplication of states and local government areas (the number of states has increased from 12 in 1967 to 36 in 1996) which have replaced these broader regions has led to the emergence of new majorities and minorities; but, the old historical contexts remain, especially with regard to the major groupings. This is one of the things that has ensured the continued political relevance of the old regions and of the ‘historical minorities,’ which remain both regional and national in scope.
While the category of majority groups remains intact, a number of scholars have identified important distinctions and reconstructions within the ranks of minorities that in fact show that there are inequalities among minorities has moved from differentiating ‘marginals’ or dispersed minorities such as the Ijaw and Ebira (cut from their kith and kin in other regions) from other minorities, distinguishing between ‘historically dominant minorities’ which were powerful overlords in the pre-colonial and colonial periods (Ijaw, Bini, Efik, Itsekiri) and ‘political minorities’ which were marginalized and excluded both from power in the regions and the overall national power grid. Some experts on the other hand, has pointed to the multiple characteristics of minorities and identified categories of powerful national minorities made up of: historically dominant minorities, which have been influential national actors; northern and southern minorities; and religious minorities, all of which have unequal access and opportunities in the power and resources arena. Finally, in the struggles for more equitable access to power in the 1990s, it became fashionable and expedient for several non-minority groups including the Igbo and some Yoruba subgroups to redefine themselves as ‘minorities’ in view of their alleged marginalization and exclusion from power and resources. Such redefinitions have not however, changed the historical context of the majority-minority cleavage.
There have been other important developments in the domain of ethnic politics. The creation of more states and local government areas has led to an expansion in the domain of salient identities, but at the same time, there has been a concentration of contestations and conflicts around local issues. This has provided the impetus for the sharpening of communal identities and conflicts, which have manifested in conflicts between ‘indigenes’ and ‘non-indigenes’, ‘sons-of-the-soil’ and ‘migrants’ and ‘settlers’. The resultant system of discriminatory citizenship has deep historical roots as we shall analyze below, however, the phenomenal rise of communal conflicts beginning from the 1990s can be partly attributed to: shrinking state resources and the attendant recourse by groups to communal resources on the one hand; and, on the other hand, to a number of state policies, interventions and omissions, including the neglect and abuse of police and security bodies, that are supportive of discriminatory practices.