Neither were all member states comfortable with the approach of some EU ambassadors in Belgrade of working to bring about regime change in Podgorica. For example, the British ambassador in Belgrade, Charles Crawford, was particularly active prior to Montenegro’s parliamentary election on 20 October 2002 in encouraging the pro-Yugoslav parties and the pro-independence LSCG Alliance to cooperate in an ultimately unsuccessful effort to defeat Djukanovic.
As already noted, some Belgrade officials have been highly critical of EU High Representative Solana for being too little interested in the content of the new union. The European Commission, although no less determined than Solana to keep the joint state together, has generally been more concerned about the nature of the integration, especially in the economic sphere. During a visit to Belgrade in July 2002, EU External Affairs Commissioner Chris Patten reportedly called for a closer economic union than envisaged in the Belgrade Agreement. This was a blow for Djukanovic, who had made much of preserving Montenegro’s economic autonomy when explaining the compromise over independence that the Agreement represented. Following Patten’s visit, Djukanovic warned that any attempt to force Montenegro into new concessions could unravel the Agreement.
The concerns of the Commission stem in large part from its desire to avoid complications as Serbia and Montenegro embark upon the Stability and Association Process and proceed towards the ultimate goal of EU membership. This again reflects the preference for a “single post box”, and the legal reality that the EU signs agreements with states, not with parts of states. For officials in Brussels, it is inconvenient to have to deal with such a small entity as Montenegro separately, and there is no appetite for having another very small state eventually join the EU – particularly now that it is generally accepted in Western European capitals that all the Balkan countries will join, sooner or later.
However, as discussed earlier, the particular, practical concerns of the European Commission notwithstanding, the EU’s policy has more to do with fears for regional stability. Solana presented his initiative to preserve the joint state as an example of conflict prevention. EU officials pointed to the supposed potential for conflict in Montenegro between supporters and opponents of independence as one reason for heading off independence moves. However, once Milosevic was no longer around to generate trouble in his neighbourhood, such concerns were misplaced, and any danger is by now so remote that it should be discounted. The most genuine worry is about Kosovo. As discussed above, however, in its overriding concern to put off addressing the status of Kosovo, the EU and the wider international community are prolonging an inherently unstable status quo, to which both Serbia and Montenegro are being held hostage.
Given the widespread dissatisfaction with the new union in Serbia and the lack of commitment to it in Montenegro, the EU should not elevate preservation of the joint state to the status of an ultimate strategic goal. Instead, it should be ready to help Serbia and Montenegro work out their relations to their own mutual satisfaction. This still appears far from the minds of many EU officials, however. On a visit to Podgorica at the end of January by ambassadors of fourteen EU states, the Greek Presidency representative repeated the Brussels line that integration with Serbia is a pre-requisite for Montenegro’s integration with the EU and that it could not join the EU on its own. As a small, poor state, deeply dependent on international assistance, such threats of EU displeasure cannot be taken lightly. However, despite the strong leverage that the EU has used to divert Montenegro temporarily from its independence course, Brussels should not congratulate itself. The union to which it played midwife is unhealthy and unlikely to survive.
The EU is well placed, if it so wished, to help Montenegro and Serbia place their relations on a sounder footing. It has considerable direct experience of integration and harmonisation. As discussed above, economic integration as part of a broader reform and restructuring process could bring positive benefits if handled sensibly, with account taken of the interests of both republics.
Political integration, including joint functions in some areas, would also make good sense, especially for Montenegro. Given its small size and limited human and financial resources, there is considerable doubt as to its capacity to maintain the range of activities of a modern state. This has already become apparent in Montenegro’s struggle with institutional reform. Eventually such issues may be resolved through EU membership, but in the meantime it would be sensible to share some functions with Serbia.
Neither economic nor political integration need necessarily imply full merger in a single state. There are plenty of examples of economic integration between states that retain important elements of independence, not least the EU itself. In December 2000 the DPS and the SDP put forward their “Platform” proposing a union of independent states with Serbia. So far, Serbia has shown little appetite for a union of that sort, and has adopted instead an “all or nothing approach” – either a full state union or nothing at all. What is important, however, is that Serbia and Montenegro work out constructively for themselves what kind of relationship they want and what level of integration suits them. Strong historical, cultural, familial and sentimental ties bind them together, and there are strong practical arguments for close cooperation as well. They should be allowed to develop those ties as they see fit, with help and advice from the EU, but without pressure.
