Unlike pressure to adopt a particular model of relationship, international pressure for reforms is wholly appropriate. It is not just that aid should be conditional on reforms being carried out that are in any case in Montenegro’s (and Serbia’s) best interest and are pre-requisites for EU integration. Strengthening the rule of law, state institutions and civil society, as well as the fight against corruption and organised crime are necessary for the region’s long-term stability.
Some international officials have cited the prevalence of organised crime activities in Montenegro as a reason for opposing independence. Such thinking is mistaken. First, while corruption and organised crime do need to be addressed seriously in Montenegro, the same can be said for several other states in the region, including Serbia. Secondly, the point should be to combat corruption and organised crime in all the states concerned, not to use the issue as an argument for
restricting the right of entities to decide their own fate.
Progress on reforms in Montenegro has been patchy. Following his assumption of the presidency in 1998, Djukanovic pursued a policy of distancing the republic from Milosevic’s Serbia and courting the favour of the West. Montenegro received substantial international assistance from the U.S. and EU, which were anxious to bolster Djukanovic’s government against a potential threat from Belgrade. Much of the aid was straight budget support, with few strings attached. Nevertheless, some support, including technical assistance, was directed at promoting reforms.
These were initially slow in getting started. Measures such as assuming control of customs and establishing a separate monetary regime, were primarily directed at cutting ties with Belgrade. However, following the fall of Milosevic, international technical assistance was stepped up and, especially after the parliamentary election in April 2001, real reforms began to be made in a number of key areas. During 2002 the pace was undermined by the extended political crisis. With much political energy devoted to the issue of the new joint state, and with a government that lacked a parliamentary majority for much of the year, reform momentum slowed.
A significant international focus has been economic reforms. These included reform of the banking sector and payments system, public finances, privatisation and an overhaul of the taxation system. Legislative measures included a series of laws designed to improve Montenegro’s business environment. Implementation remains a major challenge, and international support for the reform process will be needed for some time to come. Nevertheless, in the economic sphere it can be said that substantial progress has been made. The experience of international technical experts has been generally positive as regards the will of the authorities to carry out far-reaching reforms, although there are serious question marks about capacity.
The importance of economic reforms notwithstanding, Montenegrin authorities face their severest test in the fight against organised crime and corruption. Restoring the health of public finances is one of the government’s biggest challenges. Some economic reforms, if implemented effectively, should make government more transparent and reduce corruption. Reorganisation of the finance ministry, including the introduction of a treasury system, for example, should bring much greater transparency to public finances. According to an IMF assessment in May 2002, however, much remained to be done in reforming the finance ministry and introducing adequate budgetary controls.
International advisers of the Montenegrin government reported in October 2002 that they were encouraged by the privatisation of the formerly state-owned petroleum company, Jugopetrol, which, they said, was conducted in a correct and transparent manner. The signal that this sent goes to the crux of what many see as the problem with the way in which Montenegro has been governed. A key theme running through the campaign for the parliamentary election on 20 October 2002 was allegations by opposition parties that the authorities are irredeemably riddled with corruption and cronyism and enmeshed in organised crime. According to this view, a small group of people, closely connected with the republic’s leadership, carves up opportunities for itself, at the expense of the wider public. The properly handled Jugopetrol deal holds out hope of a real change in the way things are done.
Concerns about the extent of corruption and organised crime in Montenegro have been a persistent international theme as well. In a speech in Montenegro’s second city of Niksic in November 2002, UK Ambassador Crawford pointed to a “dangerous combination of weak institutions and strong criminals”. During the 1991-95 war and international sanctions, the smuggling of cigarettes and other items, such as stolen vehicles, through Montenegro flourished. This continued after the war, distorting economic development and political life.
Allegations touch the highest levels of government. Since the late 1990s there have repeatedly been reports in the Italian media about Montenegrin involvement in cigarette smuggling. An October 2002 civil action, brought by the EU against U.S. tobacco company R.J. Reynolds to “obtain injunctive relief to stop the laundering of the proceeds of illegal activities and to seek compensation for losses sustained” from tobacco smuggling, named President Djukanovic and another, deceased Montenegrin official as participants in the illegal trade. Reportedly, Montenegro was a key transit route for cigarettes destined for Italy. Djukanovic’s involvement has been officially investigated most recently by the Prosecutor’s Office in the Italian town of Bari. These allegations have not roused much concern in Montenegro, where such activities are often portrayed as having been a means of survival under international sanctions. However, allegations that Djukanovic had close connections with Italian crime bosses and afforded some of them protection in Montenegro and that smuggling activities continued well after the war and sanctions had ended may have a more serious different quality.
There is no doubt that smuggling through Montenegro, with the acquiescence of the authorities, was on a significant scale for many years. The fact that stolen vehicles brought into Montenegro could be registered without questions being asked as to origin was strongly suggestive of official complicity. The West looked leniently upon such activities as long as it was keen to support Djukanovic against Milosevic. Following the fall of Milosevic and as the international community turned against Djukanovic’s independence aspirations for Montenegro, accusations of crime and corruption were given prominence. Montenegrin officials see these allegations as one more means of exerting pressure in order to deflect the republic from independence.
Djukanovic and his government have taken steps in recent years to stop the smuggling rackets and crack down on the grey economy. Notably, the activities of speedboats that had plied their trade across the Adriatic to Italy have been drastically reduced. The Montenegrin authorities have actively cooperated with the Italian police against Italian criminals who sought refuge in Montenegro. Also, under EU pressure, the trade in stolen vehicles no longer receives official sanction. The authorities seem to have recognised that it is in Montenegro’s long-term interest to bring more of the grey economy into the legal sector and to end the republic’s image as a crime haven. Another step in that direction was the move, in 2002, under U.S. pressure, to end Montenegro’s status as an offshore banking centre. However, after visible success in tackling the grey economy in 2001, momentum seemed to slip in 2002. For example, black-market cigarette traders, who had largely disappeared from the streets of Podgorica, reappeared in larger numbers.
Other steps are in train that should increase transparency and reduce opportunities for corruption. Important among such efforts are reforms of the criminal justice system. A new Law on Courts took effect in 2002, among the key aims of which are to reduce the potential for political influence over appointments and procedures, and to make the judicial system generally more transparent. Other new legislation with similar aims are the Law on Prosecutors, the Law on Judges and the Law on Criminal Procedures.
An assessment of the judicial system carried out in 2002 found many persistent problems. These included politicisation of appointments and advancement, though it was suggested that changes introduced by the Law on Courts should improve matters. Notably, it alters the composition of the Judicial Council, which recommends judges for appointment by parliament, so as to reduce the possibility of political influence and make the entire process more transparent.
Another problem that the Law on Courts addresses is how cases are allocated to particular judges by court presidents. Hitherto, it was widely felt that court presidents sometimes abused this authority, for example by delivering a case to a judge known to have a particular pre-disposition on the matter, or who could be relied upon not to act upon a sensitive case. The new provision for random allocation of cases should make a positive difference.
The practice of compensating for inadequate judicial salaries by granting significant perks, is widely seen as highly corrupting, not only in the judiciary, but also in much of the administrative apparatus. The system is a holdover from the socialist era. Some judges, as well as other civil servants, are given houses, flats or housing loans from the government for free or on highly favourable terms or the 24-hour use of official cars. Although supposedly objective criteria are laid down for the distribution of such perks, in practice the system is highly non-transparent and open to abuse. It is believed that favoured officials are more likely to receive benefits, and that ruling as the government desires can bring rewards. Moves to end the practice and instead raise salaries to more realistic levels would be an important step to bolster judicial independence.
Legislative reforms alone, however, cannot resolve the entire issue of judicial independence in a country with a long tradition of politicisation of the judiciary. Real transformation will depend on a more fundamental change of habits, regardless of how good the laws become. Some judges deny that undue influence is brought to bear on them. Others, however, identify a range of pressures. In addition to those already mentioned, some cited social pressures, a particular problem in a small community where personal connections count for much in almost every aspect of life, and some acknowledge that bribery is frequent.
Another vital aspect of reform of the criminal justice system involves the police. The bad legacy of communism was compounded by further degradation of the rule of law during the Milosevic period. A top-to-bottom revolution is needed in the way the police are trained and operate and in the whole culture of a service that is bloated in numbers, often corrupt, and ineffective in tackling crime. Several years will be required to transform the Montenegrin police into a modern force.
Following the April 2001 parliamentary election, a new interior minister, Andrija Jovicevic, set about transforming his ministry. A new police law was drafted, with advice from the Council of Europe and the OSCE, and concrete measures taken to modernise and improve performance. The police training system is being overhauled, and officers retrained. Procedures have been instituted to ensure that complaints against the police are taken seriously. Reflecting the new standards, there has been a significant upsurge in cases of police officers being disciplined, dismissed or, in the worst instances, arrested for abuses. The new police law also seeks to increase transparency, including through oversight by parliament and a Council for Citizens’ Control, although scepticism, among the public and journalists is high.
Overall, there is some reason for optimism about the steps being taken to change the way in which the interior ministry and the police operate, and about the reform willingness of the ministry’s senior officials. However, at the end of 2002 the ministry was plunged into a controversy that raised serious questions about the real commitment of the top political leadership to reform.
The scandal that broke in November 2002 in the media concerned allegations of a woman of Moldovan citizenship who had taken refuge in a Women’s Safe House in Podgorica. She told how she had been held against her will, forced into prostitution and severely abused and named several senior officials as having been among her clients. The affair took on deeper significance when the police arrested, among others accused of involvement in sex trafficking, Deputy State Prosecutor Zoran Piperovic. Accusations against the prosecutor himself, Bozidar Vukcevic, were also levelled in the media.
Trafficking in women has for some time been identified as a major problem throughout the Balkans. Under Jovicevic and Deputy Interior Minister Mico Orlandic, serious steps had begun to be taken, and by December 2002, 29 people were reported to have been arrested in connection with trafficking. Senior figures in the ruling coalition gave assurances that the affair would be fully investigated. However, Djukanovic’s decision to replace Jovicevic, reportedly because of dissatisfaction at not being informed in advance of Piperovic’s arrest, appeared to many an unfortunate signal of disapproval of his zealousness in tackling trafficking. While this was denied, both Jovicevic and Orlandic were reportedly concerned that their efforts were being punished. The replacement of Jovicevic was resisted by the SDP, leading to a crisis between the governing parties that in December 2002 delayed formation of Djukanovic’s new government. Finally a new interior minister without party affiliation was agreed, while the SDP added its voice to those calling Vukcevic’s resignation.
Djukanovic signalled his belief that the affair was yet another plot, similar to the tobacco affair, to undermine Montenegro and himself. A media campaign, above all through the DPS mouthpiece, Publika, and using information leaked from the investigation set out to discredit the Moldovan woman and especially the director of the Woman’s Safe House. In late January 2003, following a visit from the U.S. consul in Podgorica, the Moldovan woman left the country. The suspects were released, and Piperovic warned that those who had allegedly fabricated the case would be made to pay.
The investigation has continued, and there seems to be no doubt that the magistrate in charge has acted correctly throughout (including on occasion rebuking officials and media for inappropriate speculation). The affair nevertheless raises awkward questions about the authorities’ willingness to tackle crime allegations when they involve senior officials. The case should, of course, be left to the judicial authorities, without pre-judging the outcome (contrary to the inappropriate behaviour of Publika and some DPS officials).
Whatever the substance of the case, trafficking and enslaving of women does exists in Montenegro. The Moldovan woman, according to her medical examination, had been seriously abused. She had pointed the finger at senior officials whom she accused of involvement in that abuse or of using the services she was forced to provide. The appropriate response from the authorities should have been to encourage the police and the investigating magistrate to investigate fully, wherever that might lead. Djukanovic, however, sacked the minister who had begun to tackle the trafficking issue. Rather than focusing on the alleged serious crimes, he, other DPS figures and Publika sought to turn the blame on to those who had allegedly fabricated the affair to discredit Montenegro and its political leadership.
The reaction of Djukanovic to this affair would be worrying enough but this is not the only case that calls into question the willingness of the authorities to tolerate criminal investigations when they touch those close to the leadership. In 2000-2001 there was a series of murders in Montenegro of people closely connected with cigarette smuggling. Among the victims were a senior police officer and an adviser to Djukanovic. This had the hallmarks of a settling of accounts among rivals in the highly lucrative smuggling business. Despite assurances the murders were being pursued, the investigation has made no progress. It is difficult not to suspect that this is one of those cases where an investigation is “put in a drawer” because it is too sensitive.
The unfortunate impression given by cases such as those described above is that when it comes to allegations of misconduct concerning senior officials, the leadership’s reaction is to close ranks. That some in Montenegro and the international community have sought to exploit allegations of criminal connections to undermine Djukanovic and the independence campaign should not obscure the fact that some of the allegations raise real issues. The tendency of the DPS to see plots behind all of them is not credible. If Montenegro is to break fully with the sanctioned lawlessness of the Milosevic era, any suspicion that those involved in criminal activities can be protected by their connections in high places must be dispelled.
The international community should strictly condition its assistance on reform progress. Change in the criminal justice system should be a litmus test. However, while it is important, legislative reform is not sufficient evidence of change. Assessing change in terms of concrete actions is not easy. Allegations of corruption and cronyism are often politicised, for opponents of the government a part of political campaigning. It is unsurprising that the authorities tend to be defensive. Nevertheless, the government presents itself as being committed to the fight against organised crime, and Djukanovic has proposed that a regional centre for this purpose be established in Podgorica, with international assistance. Whether such commitment is more than rhetoric ultimately can only be judged by solid evidence of change in Montenegro itself, not least by how cases such as those described above are handled.
